Chapter 6e
Separation of Powers


We don’t think that creating a truly democratic organization requires that we must ‘re-invent the wheel’. Some basic principles of democratic structures have stood the test of time, though the structures that employ them may have fallen victim to other pitfalls. We believe that the key to building and maintaining a True Democracy lies in devising a system that prevents, to the greatest degree possible, the amalgamation and entrenchment of unaccountable power. Thus we believe that the basic principle of ‘separation of powers’, which provides a system of checks and balances on all power, is the best governmental form factor to follow.

As can be seen from the prototype organizational chart, (org chart), we imagine a robust governing structure for the organization, divided into separate branches, each having powers, as shall be defined in the organization’s constitution, that provide checks and balances over the powers of the other branches. We believe that this basic separation of powers is necessary to prevent the accumulation and subsequent entrenchment of unaccountable power into any person, faction, or agency, as is crucial to the preservation of truly democratic function.

We posit a structure that provides this separation between the three basic functions of governance. We imagine a Legislative Branch to establish the policies and ‘laws’ of the organization, an Executive Branch to administer them, and to provide general integrating leadership, and a Judicial Branch to govern general behavior, and to ensure that the terms of the organization’s constitution are followed, and enforced when necessary.

All branches must be accountable, according to the rules set out in the organization’s constitution, to The People, recognizing that in the Judicial Branch special considerations apply. It has long been recognized that the judicial function of governance derives a greater degree of ‘blind’ objectivity, which augments the overall quality of justice provided, (particularly as pertains to the rights and considerations of minority interests, and the protections they need and deserve from a possible ‘tyranny of the majority’), when it is provided some degree of insularity from the political will of the majority. This must be thoroughly discussed in our considerations of a prototype constitution, hoping that we will share the good sense to recognize that excessive political control of a system of justice subjugates the manifestation of objective justice to partisan political will.


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